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Recent Developments

FITZGERALD v. STATE:
A Drug-Dog Sniff of Exterior Portions of a Residence Does Not
Constitute a Search Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution
By: Lindsay Victoria Ruth Moss
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a drug-dog sniff of exterior portions of a residence does not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 487, 864 A.2d 1006,
1007 (2004). The Court declined to revisit whether Article 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights contains an exclusionary rule separate
from the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. !d. at 509, 864
A.2d at 1020.
In February 2002, Detective Leeza Grim ("Grim") of the
Howard County Police Department ("HCPD") learned that petitioner
Matthew Thomas Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald") and his girlfriend, Allison
Mancini ("Mancini"), were selling high grade marijuana. Grim made
arrangements with Officer Larry Brian ("Brian") of HCPD's K-9 Unit
to visit Fitzgerald's apartment building with his drug-detecting dog,
Alex. The apartment building was accessible to the public through
unlocked glass doors. Brian and Alex performed a scan of all four
apartment doors in the building, and Alex twice indicated the presence
of narcotics outside of Fitzgerald's residence. After obtaining a search
and seizure warrant, Grim seized substantial amounts of marijuana
from the apartment. Fitzgerald and Mancini were arrested and charged
with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, among other
offenses.
Fitzgerald filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized
pursuant to the search and seizure warrant in the Circuit Court of
Howard County, claiming the dog sniff of his apartment constituted a
warrantless search. The motion was denied based on past decisions
holding that dog sniffs of public places were not searches under the
Fourth Amendment. Fitzgerald was found guilty, and the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted
certiorari in order to evaluate whether the dog sniff constituted a
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search under the Fourth Amendment or Article 26, and if so, if it was
lawful.
The Court relied on two Supreme Court cases in determining
that a warrantless dog sniff is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 490-492, 884 A.2d at 1009-1011.
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment because "the manner in which information is obtained
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a
typical search." ld. at 491, 884 A.2d at 1010.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that the
decision in Place was to be applied as a general categorization, rather
than a narrow holding applying only to dog searches of airplane
luggage. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 491, 884 A.2d at 1010. Specifically,
United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 123, affirmed the Place
holding, relying on the reasoning of the limited scope of dog sniffs,
and finding that the test "does not compromise any legitimate interest
in privacy." Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 492, 884 A.2d at 1011.
Place and Jacobson establish the current standard regarding
dog sniffs, namely, that a sniff is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment because it is used in a narrow scope like drug detection
and because it is conducted in government authorized locations, such
as a public place. /d. at 493, 884 A.2d at 1011. A "crucial
component.. .is the focus on the scope and nature of the sniff... rather
than on the object sniffed, in determining whether a legitimate privacy
interest exists." !d. A dog sniff is narrow in scope because it does not
involve an intrusion and no non-contraband items are revealed. /d. at
494, 884 A.2d at 1011-12.
The Court of Appeals found that Maryland has applied this
precedent in Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 581, 774 A.2d 420, 436
(200 1), holding that a dog sniff of a car is a not a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 495, 884 A.2d at 1012.
The Court stated that a dog sniff alone does not constitute an intrusive
search, and found Place to be "applicable to dog sniffs in general,
independent of the object searched, because of the sniffs narrow
scope." /d. at 495, 884 A.2d at 1012 (quoting Wilkes, 364 Md. 544,
581, 774 A.2d 420).
The instant case is one of first impression in Maryland because
the Court . has not ruled on the constitutionality of a dog sniff
performed on the outside of a residence. /d. at 495, 884 A.2d at 1012.
The Court rejected Fitzgerald's argument that the outside of a
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residence should be differentiated from other dog sniffs because this
type of search "intrudes upon the privacy of the home," and is,
therefore, unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. !d. at 496,
884 A.2d at 1013. The Court concluded that the cases he relied upon,
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), and Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001), are not relevant to the dog sniff doctrine.
Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 496, 884 A.2d at 1013. The Court determined
that, in Karo, the broad utility of an electronic beeper used to monitor
a can of ether, the intent to detect non-contraband material, and the
electronic aspect were all important factors that distinguished those
facts from the present case. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 497, 884 A.2d at
1013-14.
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal
imaging to detect heat inside a residence for the purpose of
establishing the presence of marijuana constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 498, 884 A.2d at 1014.
Fitzgerald claims that the "general public use" standard elaborated in
Kyllo should also apply to dog sniffs. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 499, 884
A.2d at 1014-1015. This standard relates to information obtained from
the interior of a home through the use of sense-enhancing technology
that could not have otherwise been obtained without a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. !d. at 499, 844 A.2d at
1014. The Court of Appeals saw no connection between thermal
imaging technology and dog sniffs, stating that "a dog is not
technology-- he or she is a dog." !d. at 500, 884 A.2d at 1015. The
Court further explained that a dog is not an advancing technology
because dogs have achieved all limitations and advances, in
comparison to technology, which is forever advancing. !d. at 501, 884
A.2d at 1016.
Lastly, the Court rejected the argument that dog sniffs have the
potential for revealing intimate details of one's home, unlike thermal
imaging, reasoning that "[a] person does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in contraband, but does in bath water." !d. at
501, 884 A.2d at 1016. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that a
dog sniff of the exterior of a residence was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment, provided that the dog and police are lawfully
present at the site of the sniff. !d. at 503-504, 884 A.2d at 1017.
The Court next addressed the argument that even if a dog sniff
was considered a non-search under the Fourth Amendment, it would
constitute a search under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. !d. at 506, 884 A.2d at 1019. Article 26 provides that "all
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warrants, without oath or affirmation ... to search suspected places ...
are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search
suspected places ... without naming or describing the place ... are
illegal, and ought not to be granted." /d. Fitzgerald supports his
argument by noting that Article 26 "was designed to protect the
sanctity of the home, thus, creating stronger protection than the Fourth
Amendment for sniffs outside a residence." /d. at 507, 884 A.2d at
1019.
The Court found that Maryland is notably absent from the
current trend of states adopting exclusionary rules for their state
constitutions. /d. at 508, 884 A.2d at 1020. Maryland currently
construes Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment. /d.
at 508, 884 A.2d at 1020. The Court saw no need to revisit whether
Article 26 contains an exclusionary rule, because even if it accepted
Fitzgerald's argument that a dog sniff did constitute a search, the sniff
would remain valid under a reasonable suspicion standard, which is
adopted by the majority of state constitutions. /d. at 511, 884 A.2d at
1022. Provided that the police had a reasonable suspicion that a
residence contained illegal contraband, the validity of the dog sniff
would be upheld. /d. at 510, 884 A.2d at 1021.
In Fitzgerald v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
broadened the validity of dog sniffs, when used to detect illegal
contraband, to include exterior portions of residences accessible to the
public. This ruling will have far reaching consequences, giving greater
protection to places of residence that are in gated or secured
communities. It may also be interpreted as giving greater protections
under the law to individuals that can afford to reside in wealthier
communities that are less accessible to the general public.
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